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August/1/2010

Civil Rights Update

By: Jonathan M. Bernstein, Esq.
Goldberg Segalla, LLP
jbernstein@goldbergsegalla.com

(From the Summer 2010 Newsletter)
       
Title VII

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4165

In 1995, the City of Chicago administered a written examination to applicants seeking firefighter positions.  In 1996, the City announced that it would draw candidates randomly from a list of applicants that scored at least 89 out of 100 points on the examination.  These applicants were given designations.  The City informed applicants that scored below 65 that they had failed, would not be considered further and were deemed not qualified.  The City informed applicants scoring between 65 and 88 that they were designated as “qualified” and that it was unlikely that they would be called for further processing, but that the City would keep them on the eligibility list.  Over six years, the City selected its first class of applicants to advance.  In March 1997, several African-Americans scoring in the qualified range, but had not been hired, filed discrimination charges with the EEOC and received right to sue letters.  The plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the City’s practice of selecting only applicants scoring 89 or above had a disparate impact on African Americans in violation of Title VII.  The Seventh Circuit held that the suit was untimely because the EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after the discriminatory act of sorting the scores into the well qualified, qualified, and not qualified categories.  The Seventh Circuit held that later hiring decisions based on the test results were not new discriminatory acts.   The Supreme Court disagreed.

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of an employment practice may assert a disparate-impact claim in a timely manner when the application of that practice occurs as long as he or she alleges each of the elements of a disparate-impact claim.  A plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  The Court held that the employment practice of excluding passing applicants scoring below 89 was the type of employment practice that fell under Title VII.  Simply put, a plaintiff may file a timely EEOC charge when the claim is made within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice is used when determining not to hire the plaintiff.

Contract Clause
 
Donohue v. Paterson, 1:10-cv-00543 (NDNY 2010)
Governor David Patterson and the New York State Legislature passed emergency appropriation bills.  The bills enacted unpaid furloughs, a wage freeze, and a benefit freeze on certain groups of employees employed by New York State.  The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.  That clause provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts.  The Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing any emergency appropriation bill containing a furlough.  The Court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of showing that the permanent 20% loss in salary and wages that the furlough plan effected constituted irreparable harm.  Irreparable harm flowed from the defendants’ failure to pay contracted for increases in salaries and wages, which were negotiated years prior to the challenge extender bill.  The Court held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that other alternatives were considered before resorting to such a drastic impairment of contracts.  The Court rejected the defendants’ simple reliance on the fiscal crisis in New York as the basis for warranting the cuts.

Miranda Warning

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4379
The respondent was brought into police custody and subject to questioning regarding a shooting.  The respondent was provided his Miranda warning.  About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, an officer asked the respondent if he would pray for forgiveness for shooting a boy.  The respondent answered “yes”.  The respondent moved to suppress the statement.  The Supreme Court held that the statement was admissible.  The Court held that the respondent failed to invoke his right to remain silent.  The respondent did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police.  The Court held that had respondent made either of these statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning.  Because he did neither, he did not invoke the right to remain silent.  The Court held that when the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. 

Due Process

Harrington v. County of Suffolk, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11375 (2d Cir. 2010)

The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim.  The plaintiffs brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting that the defendants deprived them of a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an inadequate investigation into their son’s fatal traffic accident.  The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest in an adequate police investigation.  The Suffolk County Code provided that it was the duty of the police department to preserve public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, protect the rights of persons and property, and enforce all laws and ordinances applicable to the County.  The Court held that the duty imposed by the Suffolk County Code was to the public generally and not to individual crime victims.  Such universal benefits do not equate to a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

(From the June 2010 Newsletter)
(From the May 2010 Newsletter)
(From the April 2010 Newsletter)
(From the March 2010 Newsletter)
(From the February 2010 Newsletter)






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August 2010 NEWSLETTER


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